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"Greenmail" refers to purchases, at a premium over the market
price, of shares of a corporation's stock from persons making a
takeover bid. Greenmail can be seen as an aspect of the self-
regulatory process, the combination of business practices and
legal formalities, which defines United States capitalism. The
reality of the system characterized by greenmail, however,
involves a good deal more than self-regulation.
Since considerably fewer than 51% of the corporation's shares
are involved, payment of greenmail does not itself guarantee
retention of control by management. As takeover bids have
become more common, therefore, additional techniques have
been developed: creation of classes of stock bearing dispropor-
tionate voting powers ("super stock"), sale of particularly valua-
ble properties ("crown jewels") to make the takeover less
attractive, and large bonuses available to incumbent manage-
ment if the takeover succeeds ("golden parachutes").
The need to deal with these complexities causes a corporation
to incur massive fees for investment advisory and legal services
to management. Purchase by a corporation of its own stock in a
greenmail transaction must be accompanied by a "standstill"
agreement halting further purchases by the takeover bidder if
the particular payment is to serve its purpose, and the issuance of
super stock must be defended as something which does not
defraud existing shareholders, a defense that must also be estab-
lished if the sale of corporate crown jewels and the payment of
golden parachute bonuses are to pass judicial muster.
The problems involved in greenmail have been with us since it
occurred to someone that a corporation could be controlled by
something less than 50% of its outstanding shares. What makes
greenmail troublesome today is that nothing in our system either
adequately measures the value of control and/or provides legal
guidelines for the regulation of the market in which control of a
corporation is traded.
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School
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I. PRECEDENTIAL GUIDES
In Pernman v. Feldmann,' our legal process addressed the
problem being described. The year was 1955, and the Second
Circuit, which reversed the district judge's dismissal of the com-
plaint, was at the time recognized as the de facto Supreme Court
in the area of securities regulation.
Feldmann bought and sold interests in corporations and, dur-
ing the days leading up to the Korean War, controlled Newport
Steel Corporation, a producer with a large war-allocation of steel
products. Feldmann's interest was purchased, at a considerable
premium, by end-users of steel whose operations were threat-
ened by the shortages of steel produced by the needs of the
military. Largely because there was no evidence that the new
stockholders were given price discounts, the district judge held
that plaintiffs had not stated a cause of action.
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
control premium had to be shared with stockholders excluding
the purchasers of Feldmann's interest. The decision produced a
flurry of academic commentary attempting to fit the decision
into the mosaic of existing decisions. The courts were less
troubled by the hobgoblins of coherence and consistency. In
1962, in Honigman v. Green Giant,2 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals refused to apply the Feldmann rationale to a family
owning all of the voting stock in a corporation which received a
"premium" amount of new stock in exchange for the surrender of
exclusive voting control. In that same year, in Essex Universal
Corp. v. Yates, 3 a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, faced with the need to define control, wrote three
separate opinions which agreed only that a full trial would have
to be held in the district court. The opinion by Judge Clark, the
shortest of the three, had a footnote stating that "possible claims
under the rule of Perlman v. Feldmann and other similar issues
are not involved." 4 Judge Clark had authored Perlman v.
Feldmann.
At the time the Feldmann opinion was written, law in the field
of securities regulation was centered on private lawsuits seeking
'219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
2309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1962).
1305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
4 Id. at 580.
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to enforce the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule X-
10b-5.5 That rule governed fraudulent practices in connection
with the purchase and sale of securities. Cases brought under the
rule subsequently involved issues such as reliance and scienter
whose precise delineation was sufficiently technical in nature to
preclude the conflicts among circuits that would produce a grant
of certiorari by the Supreme Court.
Prior to the suit brought by Perlman, Feldmann's transaction
had been attacked under the provisions of Rule X-10b-5. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld dismissal of that suit,
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,6 by focussing on the provision
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that prohibits corporate
insiders from retaining profits earned from short-swing (6-
month) purchases and sales:
Section 16(b) ... expressly gave the corporate issuer or its
stockholders a right of action against corporate insiders
using their position to profit in the sale or exchange of corpo-
rate securities. The absence of a similar provision in Section
10(b) strengthens the conclusion that that section was
directed solely at that type of misrepresentation or fraudu-
lent practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of
securities rather than at fraudulent mismangement of corpo-
rate affairs, and that Rule X-10b-5 extended protection only
to the defrauded purchaser or seller.7
A Rule 10b-5 claim could be stated under Birnbaum simply by
alleging that acts of fraudulent mismanagement had an impact
on the price of a corporation's securities. That allegation, as later
cases made clear, would be sufficient for a claim of fraud in
federal court in connection with the purchase or sale of the cor-
poration's securities. The basis for this distinction between "pur-
chase" fraud and "management" fraud was recognition of the
fact that it was the law of the states, and not of the federal
government, which was charged with the task of regulating acts
of fraudulent mismanagement. The Birnbaum decision was
therefore accepted by the bar as an example of the politically
necessary doctrinal distinctions required by the coexistence of
dual state and federal sovereignties in our federal system.
It took little more than a decade to expose the problems of the
Birnbaum distinction. In 1968, the Second Circuit rendered an en
5 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1984).
1193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
7Id. at 464.
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banc opinion in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.8 that was read by
the bar as an attempt to clarify and settle the law of Rule X-10b-
5. Profits from trading in the corporation's stock had been made
by persons who were aware of drilling results that indicated a
mineral "strike." The district judge, on the basis of undisputed
expert testimony, had held that knowledge of those results was
not "material" in terms of providing a basis from which the mag-
nitude of the "strike" could be extrapolated. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed on the basis that "insider trading activ-
ity, which surely constitutes highly pertinent evidence and the
only truly objective evidence of the materiality of the ... discov-
ery . . . was apparently disregarded by the court below in favor
of the testimony of defendants' expert witnesses . ...- 9
This holding about trading demonstrating materiality, by
merging the purposes of Section 16(b) and Rule 10b-5, made
impossible the careful delineation of elements of fraud that had
represented the response of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
to Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 10 the decision which in 1947
first discovered that the Securities and Exchange Commission's
Rule X-10b-5 had created a cause of action for persons who
brought or sold a corporation's shares.
Kardon had been made possible by the fact that Rule X-10b-5
could be read to cover any case in which information was con-
cealed in a transaction involving corporate securities. The year
was 1947, and because more than a decade had passed since
1934, it did not seem relevant that the Securities Act of 1933 had
focussed on the issuance of new securities and the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act on the trading of securities. The idea that the
purchase and sale of securities was a sufficient basis for federal
jurisdiction only insofar as it had occurred in connection with one
of those processes was a bit of statutory construction that, in
1947, seems not to have occurred to anyone.
The jurisdictional and venue provisions of the 1934 Act,
moreover, gave federal courts the power to right wvrongs which
formerly could not be the subject of trial because the defendant
had left the state. Consequently, the federal courts, after 1947, as
in Perlman v. Feldmann, became the favored forum even where
1401 F.2d &3:3 (2d Cir. 1968).
9 Id. at 851.
1073 F.Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
[Vol. 59
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the cause of action most likely to succeed involved state corpo-
rate law.
While the result reached in Texas Gulf Sulphur may have clari-
fied the law of Rule 10b-5, the guidelines enunciated, because
they were based on policies derived from Section 16(b) of the
Exchange Act, as well as those underlying Rule 10b-5 promul-
gated under the Securities Act, clearly covered situations which
Rule 10b-5 was not intended to reach. That realization came in
1975, in the case of Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,11
where the Supreme Court stated:
We quite agree that if Congress had legislated the ele-
ments of a private cause of action for damages, the duty of
the Judicial Branch would be to administer the law which
Congress enacted; the judiciary may not circumscribe a
right which Congress has conferred because of any disagree-
ment it might have with Congress about the wisdom of
creating so expansive a liability. But as we have pointed out,,
we are not dealing here with any private right created by the
express language of section 10(b) or of Rule 10b-5. No lan-
guage in either of those provisions speaks at all to the con-
tours of a private cause of action for their violation.
However flexibly we may construe the language of both
provisions, nothing in such construction militates against the
Birnbaum rule. We are dealing with a private cause of action
which has been judicially found to exist, and which will have
to be judicially delimited one way or another unless and
until Congress addresses the question. Given the peculiar
blend of legislative, administrative, and judicial history
which now surrounds Rule 10b-5, we believe that practical
factors to which we have adverted, and to which other
courts have referred, are entitled to a good deal of weight.
Thus we conclude that what may be called considerations
of policy, which we are free to weigh in deciding this case,
are by no means entirely on one side of the scale. Taken
together with the precedential support for the Birnbaum
rule over a period of more than 20 years, and the consistency
of that rule with what we can glean from the intent of Con-
gress, they lead us to conclude that it is a sound rule and
should be followed. 12
Searching their law for aids in the task of giving content to
Blue Chip, circuit courts rapidly discovered that "precedential
support for the Birnbaum rule" was, to put it politely, somewhat
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unclear. In the Second Circuit, for example, at the time Blue
Chip was decided, the status of Birnbaum was that "although
some courts have held that a private party not a purchaser or
seller, seeking injunctive relief, may have standing to assert a
Section 10(b) violation . . . and another has suggested the elimi-
nation of the purchaser-seller requirement ... it is still the rule in
this circuit that the requirement be satisfied in a suit for dam-
ages.' 13 Blue Chip can thus be read either as mandating a return
to the standing requirements delineated in Birnbaum or simply as
drawing to a halt the expansion of Rule 10b-5 federal jurisdiction.
The relevant question, however, is not the precise holding of
Blue Chip, but the significance of that opinion's opacity for the
problems raised by greenmail. It could be argued that the law
reviewed above is simply irrelevant to the problem under consid-
eration since takeover bids are governed by the detailed provi-
sions of the Williams Act. 14 However, the guideline courts have
derived from the Williams Act is that neither the target manage-
ment nor the takeover bidder was intended to be favored when
Congress promulgated this regulatory code. Such a rule might
appear obvious and fair, but such a conclusion simply does not
address the problems raised by the process which the legislation
is intended to govern. The question arises, therefore, as to
whether and to what degree the judicial attitude toward securi-
ties legislation embodied in Blue Chip has precedential signifi-
cance for takeover bids.
II. PROBLEMS POSED By GREENMAIL
It is tempting to characterize Blue Chip as a conservative,
backward-looking decision, and leave matters at that. It is tempt-
ing but dangerous, as ideological designations always are,
because they reduce the complexity of an obdurate reality to
simple terms which permit an uncomplicated emotional
response. The rule of Birnbaum, which Blue Chip declared law,
represents an attempt to accommodate the dual sovereignties of
a federal system. To define that rule, therefore, requires an
appreciation of developments in the federal system during the
years since Birnbaum was handed down.
13 lngenito v. Bermec Corp., 376 F.Supp. 1154, 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
1415 U.S.C. §78n(d) (1982).
f[Vol. 59
HeinOnline  -- 59 Conn. B.J. 288 1985
CRISIS AND PROPOSED SOLUTION
The implementation of Brown v. Board of Education'5 by the
federal judiciary produced a response: state authorities utilizing
their law-making powers to preserve the segregationist status
quo. The mechanism utilized by the federal courts to counteract
this response was the "federalization" of United States law -
findings that state law was pre-empted because of possible con-
flicts with federal legislation and expansive readings of
jurisdictional grants in federal statutes. The legal community
inevitably became aware of this phenomenon, and began to
express concern. It was Herbert Wechsler who became asso-
ciated with the phrase "neutrality," in terms of which this con-
cern was expressed. Strikingly, however, it was also Herbert
Wechsler, this time in collaboration with Henry Hart, who pro-
vided the rationale that made it possible to live with this concern.
It was Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal
System' 6 that elaborated for the profession a view of law as
process, that habituated a generation of lawyers to a perception
of the legal structure as nothing more than a system to be oper-
ated efficiently.
In Perlman v. Feldmann, for example, the dissent ends with a
complaint about the direct recovery permitted by the majority to
the plaintiffs, a holding inconsistent with the "derivative"nature
of the injury for which redress was being given: "If a corporate
asset was sold," says Judge Swan, "surely the corporation should
recover the compensation received for it by the defendants. "17
The corporate asset in question, control of the steel produced by
Newport, had been acquired on August 31, 1950, by a group of
end-users incorporated as Wilport Company. In an agreement
dated December 18, 1953, Wilport agreed to transfer its control-
ling interest in Newport to a corporation controlled by Louis E.
Wolfson. The price Wolfson paid was half what Wilport had
paid.
In its Petition for Rehearing, Newport argued that "the court
erred in ordering the ... profits to be paid directly to stock-
holders and a rehearing on this sole issue is requested.' 18 In a
memorandum to the other members of the panel that had
decided the case, Judge Clark noted about this petition that:
15347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16 Published in 1953.
17219 F.2d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 1955).
s Petition for Rehearing at 2 (1955).
1985]
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This seems to me a properly shrewd move, which I com-
mend on that level; since the lush situation is now deteriorat-
ing judicialwise, Newport wants to get back for its crowd of
insiders the money paid Feldmann to get its preferred posi-
tion. But the reasons we gave against this before still stand.
Newport's argument seems confined to the semantic level:
"since this is a stockholder's derivative suite, ergo." Omit the
premise as we should, since it was the other stockholders
who were primarily injured, and there is nothing left. Practi-
cally our result is the only one which has meaning in any
attempt to hold these trade buccaneers to a modicum of
morality. 19
Judge Swan responded: "As I disagreed with the opinion on
this point (last paragraph of my dissent) I naturally think the
petition should be granted. But if my brothers deny it I shall
make no squawk but prefer not to sign the order,"2 ° resulting in a
per curiam order, signed only by Judges Clark and Frank, which
denied the petition for rehearing. This judicial action can be
characterized as legal realism in action, a refusal to impose on
judicial remedies the arbitrary limitations embodied in legal
rules. Thus, refusing to permit a derivative form of recovery
made it possible to exclude the Newport shares held by Wilport
from the class entitled to payment. Wilport, however, no longer
held the shares in question, so the issue arose whether Wolfson
should be considered, in Clark's terms, sufficiently a "trade buc-
caneer" to justify denying him recovery.
It is, of course, difficult to distinguish "trade buccaneers" from
effective competitors. Unless we postulate the impossibility of
competitive practices that are destructive of a market, however,
it is clear that the distinction attempted by Clark must, in theory,
be a possible one. And Max Weber, in The Protestant Ethic and
the Spirit of Capitalism,21 made precisely such a distinction
between pirates and entrepreneurs in describing the historical
evolution of capitalist institutions:
[T]he capitalistic adventurer has existed everywhere.
With the exception of trade and credit and banking transac-
tions [his] activities were predominantly of an irrational and
speculative character, or directed to acquisition by force,
above all the acquisition of booty, whether directly in war or
'
9 Charles E. Clark memorandum at 1.
20 Thomas W. Swan memorandum at 1.
21 T. Parsons transl., pp. 20, 21, 24 (1946).
[Vol. 59
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in the form of continuous fiscal booty by exploitation of
subjects.
But in modern times the Occident has developed, in addi-
tion to this, a very different form of capitalism which has
appeared nowhere else: the rational capitalistic organization
of (formally) free labour.
Now the peculiar modern Western form of capitalism has
been, at first sight, strongly influenced by the development
of technical possibilities. Its rationality is today essentially
dependent on the calculability of the most important techni-
cal factors. But this means fundamentally that it is depend-
ent on the peculiarities of modern science, especially the
natural sciences based on mathematics and exact and
rational experiment.
The relevance of the transition from pirate to entrepreneur is
demonstrated by the significant changes that have occurred on
the business scene since Perlnan v. Feldmann was handed down.
Thus, both Feldmann and Wolfson shared the characteristic of
being known as purchasers and sellers of controlling interests in
corporations. In the past quarter-century, however, the corporate
conglomerate, the combination by means of controlling stock
interests of a number of corporate entities engaged in a variety of
businesses, has become a relatively commonplace phenomenon.
The result has been that the market has frequently valued such
entities as the equivalent of incorporated mutual funds. ITT, for
example, one of the pioneers in making the conglomerate form
acceptable, did not perform noticeably better than the stock
market average during the tenure as chairman of its architect,
Harold Geneen.
Simultaneously, public relations campaigns by stock
exchanges advertising the benefits of investments in corporate
securities, combined with the growth of such institutions as pen-
sion plans and mutual funds, created a vastly larger group of
persons sophisticated about the trading process. It became
increasingly difficult, as time went on, to distinguish between the
speculator whose activities had been the target of New Deal
securities legislation and the investor to whom Kardon permitted
a federal cause of action on allegations of fraud committed in
connection with the purchase or sale of a corporate security.
Expansion of the class of persons who do not need and might
abuse the possibility of access to the legal process makes inescap-
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able the question of the advisability of seeking a legal solution to
the problems posed by greenmail.
III. PROBLEMS POSED By SUPER STOCK
Since takeover bids are directed at securing control of the
board of directors, the Williams Act is technically part of Section
14,22 the provision of the 1934 Exchange Act granting authority to
the Securities and Exchange Commission over the proxy process,
the rules governing the ballots, and communications on the basis
of which shareholders cast their votes. The fact that corporate
securities normally grant to the holder a right to vote makes the
problems of greenmail inevitable. Thus, where .the vote is cru-
cial, the security can be seen as a political instrument, whose use
must be assessed in terms of compliance with legal norms,
whereas in the ordinary case the security is viewed by an investor
simply as an economic instrument, the value of which may most
effectively be determined by the play of market forces.
The nature of the problem is made clearest by considering the
super stock takeover defense, where a security carrying voting
power disproportionate to its value in terms of contribution to
the corporate's capital structure has been created on behalf of
earlier shareholders. Such a defense is usually justified with the
argument that existing shareholders, the persons whose securities
might decline in value, can complain only if the market for their
shares is adversely affected. In theoretical terms, this is, of
course, the argument that corporate stock is properly perceived
solely as an economic good, and that the function of corporate
law is to regulate the operations of the market which creates a
value for it.
Thus, if one wishes to oppose the issuance of super stock, one
argues that the transaction tilts the balance established by the
Williams Act in favor of target management. The argument
being made is that the market, when it is not interfered with by
"anti-competitive" devices such as super stock, is in fact disciplin-
ing management by assigning a value to management's efforts as
represented by the market price of all outstanding securities, and
that the courts should utilize the powers granted by the Williams
Act to prevent interference with the workings of the marketplace
2215 U.S.C. §78n(d) (1982).
[Vol. 59
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through the issuance of stock whose function is preservation of
the status quo.
Balancing the values inherent in preservation of the status quo
against the policies which prohibit interference with profitable
sales by existing shareholders is a matter that involves considera-
tion of the interests both of the corporation and of the society it
serves. Long-range considerations of this type have historically
been undertaken in our legal system by state courts applying
fiduciary principles of conduct to corporate affairs as a justifica-
tion for requiring strict compliance with statutory provisions.
Since 1947 and Kardon, however, that law-making activity has
increasingly been transferred to federal courts as in Perlman v.
Feldmann.
In the case of super stock, for example, it is clear that most
state corporate statutes no longer place effective limitations on
the provisions of a share of common stock. Until recently, bodies
like the New York Stock Exchange imposed requirements such
as voting rights, but even these limitations are becoming increas-
ingly ineffective as competition for new business among ex-
changes increases. If the problem of corporate control is to be
analyzed, therefore, the relevant question is how the rule of Birn-
baum can be made effective.
Certainly we cannot pretend that Blue Chip simply returns us
to the days of Birnbaum and Perlman. Federal courts could not
long in good faith maintain, as Judge Clark did in Perlman v.
Feldmann, that they are promulgating common law interpreta-
tions of fiduciary principles established by state law as opposed
to expansive readings of federal legislation. The question, there-
fore, in connection with greenmail, is whether an effective fed-
eral statutory provision can be designed. The difficulty with
designing such a provision is the intimate connection between
the source of greenmail payments and the market mechanism.
IV. LIMITS OF THE LAW
Greenmail in the normal course is produced by a gap between
the value of a corporation's assets which can be sold and the
current market value of the corporation's outstanding shares. Dif-
ferent market mechanisms, in other words, are producing differ-
ing valuations. Neither mechanism is infallible, since both
valuations are the product of historical events, accounting con-
19851
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ventions, and predictions about the future. The issue here is
whether a statutory mechanism could produce a more useful
result. Thus, as demonstrated in the case of ITT, it appears that
the market itself deals with such situations if permitted to
operate.
It is difficult to fashion a legal rule governing greenmail
because of the existence of the business judgement rule, which
requires judicial deference to people in control of corporate
activities whenever the actions taken could even arguably have
been supported by business considerations. Section 531 of the
Internal Revenue Code, on the other hand, penalizes unreasona-
ble accumulations of profits by a corporation, an accepted busi-
ness motive for the purpose of sheltering that income from
additional higher personal taxes when paid out to shareholders as
dividends, by taxing such profits at a prohibitive rate. The anal-
ogy suggested is that transactions entered into for the purpose of
dealing in corporate control be subject to a prohibitive tax. In
both cases, the inquiry turns on the intent underlying the corpo-
rate transaction, primarily a question of fact, and reference has
been made to such a provision as Section 531 solely to establish
that courts have proven themselves capable of administering a
factual determination of intent.
Should the takeover bid be made to holders of 100% of a corpo-
ration's securities, no tax would be levied. In any other situation,
however, a finding that control was being sought primarily for
the purpose of short-term profit maximization would permit a
tax on the corporation in an amount equal to the gap in values
that provides the basis for greenmail.
The most likely objection is, of course, the draconian nature of
the remedy. Not only is the tax punitive, but such a remedy, it
can be argued, fails to deal with most of the practices that make
what we have been calling greenmail a problem, such things as
super stocks, and the purchese and sale of desirable and undesir-
able corporate assets. This argument could be buttressed by ref-
erence to the anti-greenmail tax legislation introduced by Senate
Finance Committee Member John Chafee, which would deny
deductibility to the expenses of producing greenmail and alter
[Vol. 59
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the tax treatment of interest on debt and stock purchases entered
into as part of a merger in a hostile takeover situation. 23
Unlike the Chafee bill, which simply uses the tax law to make a
given practice more expensive, the provision suggested attempts
to deal with the problem rather than its manifestations. What is
being proposed is the prohibition of a given transaction, the
drawing of a legal line and declaration that behavior falling out-
side that line should not be permitted to take place. The response
to the argument about the draconian nature of the remedy, in
other words, is that what Chafee would accomplish is simply to
adjust the market, to raise the price of control.
The rationale of the provision being proposed, on the other
hand, is to bar resort to the market mechanism, on the ground
that the transaction violates the agreement entered into by the
corporation when its charter was granted by the state. It is stock
market arbitrageurs, not corporations, who are in the business of
short-term profit maximization in connection with purchases and
sales of corporate securities.
Such questions as whether the corporation could recover the
tax from the persons making the takeover bid and/or from per-
sons who accepted that bid need not be addressed by the pro-
posed statute. If the control premium is an asset that can, under
proper circumstances, be claimed by the government that makes
the corporate system possible, then the impact of that claim on
interactions among constituent elements of the corporate system
- managers, stockholders, directors, and the entity itself - can
be left to general principles of corporate law. One may ask,
however, why this remedy, even assuming that courts would be
capable of administering it, should be regarded as the best way
of forcing consideration of the value ignored in the pursuit of
short-term profit maximization. Let us put to one side the possi-
bility that states will authorize charters permitting corporations
to have as a purpose short-term profit maximization in connec-
tion with purchases and sales of their securities. Law can never
' On July 8, 1985, the Financial Accounting Standards Board of the Financial
Accounting Foundation, released for public comment Proposed FASB Technical Bul-
letin No. 85-e, whereby (i) greenmail premium payments by a corporation are to be
excluded from the cost of the treasury shares acquired, (ii) amounts attributed to a
"standstill" agreement may not be capitalized, and (iii) costs incurred by the corporation
to defend itself from a takeover attempt, costs attributed to a "standstill" agreement, and
piremiums paid for treasury shares in excess of current marked price, may not be classi-
ied as extraordinary items - Ed.
1985]
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successfully prevent something society wants even after people
have been made aware of all possible objections, and no statute
can succeed if the society for which the legislation is drafted
sufficiently strongly supports what the drafters of the statute see
as an abuse. The question that should be answered, therefore, is
why a statutory solution which might be ignored should be sup-
ported when one has the alternative of accepting the Chafee
approach of "raising the ante." The answer is that judicial "raising
the ante" - acceptance of a view of law as something that can
deal only with manifestations of a problem rather than address-
ing the problem itself - is the phenomenon that underlies the
transition from Birnbaum to Blue Chip.
In 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education,2 4 the Supreme Court
of the United States was confronted with the question whether to
overrule Plessy v. Ferguson,25 which established the "separate
but equal" rule in connection with the Fourteenth Amendment.
In addressing that issue, Brown first quotes the "intangible con-
siderations" on the basis of which earlier Supreme Court opinions
had forced Negroes admitted to white graduate schools to be
treated like all other students rather than being separated. Noting
that "such considerations [of ways in which separation solely on
the basis of race generates feelings of inferiority] apply with
added force to children in grade and high schools,"26 the Brown
Court quotes a factual finding about the detrimental effects of
segregation by a lower court which nevertheless had followed
Plessy. The Supreme Court then concludes as follows:
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological
knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is
amply supported by modern authority. [n. 11 citing socio-
logical and psychological authorities]. Any language in
Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.27
The Brown Court knew it was making law. It was presumably
in an effort to appear authoritative that the Court did not over-
rule either Dred Scott or Plessy. Only language was overruled,
and scientific evidence was relied on to justify a shift in position.
The "all deliberate speed" formula coined in Brown I1P8 sounded
24347 U.S. 483 (1954).
-163 U.S. 537 (1896).
2347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
27 Id. at 495-496.
21349 U.S. 294 (1955).
[Vol. 59
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both judicious and authoritative, and the decision to spell out
details of implementation rather than simply remanding the
cases before it for resolution in accordance with the law as it now
stood can be seen as no more than a realistic approach to the
work done by the judiciary. Similarly, the group of theorists
known as Legal Realists - and Judge Clark, who wrote Perlman
v. Feldmann, was one - would no doubt have applauded the
psychological and sociological citations in note 11 as signifying
an unwillingness on the part of the Brown Court to continue to
feel itself constrained by older, more technical approaches to the
tasks of legal reasoning.
The fact remains, however, that legal opinions are precisely
rationalizations of results reached on the basis of "intangible con-
siderations." The question raised by the Realists is whether opin-
ions should continue to attempt to persuade the reader about the
correctness of a judge's application of the older "science of iaw,"
a determination of the placement of the line between the right
and the wrong, or whether courts should implement the law by
applying to legal controversies the results of studies utilizing the
mathematical and social sciences as part of a process of changing
social behavior in accordance with the findings of such studies.
It is easy, but dangerous, to persuade ourselves that these two
ways of looking at the law amount to the same thing, a descrip-
tion of what judges do in fact. The result of such an equation, I
suggest, has been in the past half-century an era in which both
integrationists and corporate reformers have learned about the
limits on what law can accomplish. Refusing to accommodate
those limits, moreover, will make law less, rather than more,
effective in the future. It is realistic not to demand of the law
more than it can do.
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